Amazon Web Services Updated SAA-C03 Exam Questions and Answers by paula

Amazon API Gateway with CloudFront: API Gateway allows you to create, deploy, and manage APIs, while CloudFront provides a CDN to deliver content with low latency and high transfer speeds.

AWS WAF (Web Application Firewall):

AWS WAF can be configured in CloudFront to protect against common web exploits, including SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS).

WAF allows you to create custom rules to block specific attack patterns and can be managed centrally.

Configuration:

Deploy your APIs using Amazon API Gateway.

Set up an Amazon CloudFront distribution in front of the API Gateway.

Configure AWS WAF on the CloudFront distribution to apply security rules.

Operational Efficiency: This solution provides robust protection with minimal operational overhead by leveraging managed AWS services, ensuring that your APIs are secure without extensive custom implementation.

To optimize costs for long-term data storage, AWS recommends using S3 Lifecycle policies to automate transitions across storage classes and ultimately expire old data.

S3 Standard-IA is suited for data that is accessed less frequently but requires millisecond retrieval times. It is ideal for 6-month-old data still used in monthly reports.

S3 Glacier Deep Archive is the lowest-cost option, designed for data accessed once or twice a year, such as regulatory audits — perfect for 2+ year-old data.

Lifecycle expiration rules allow S3 to automatically delete objects older than 7 years, aligning with the business retention policy.

These transitions are cost-effective and fully automated, aligning with the Cost Optimization pillar in the AWS Well-Architected Framework.

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S3 Storage Class Comparison

Lifecycle Management

The most secure way to grant an external vendor’s AWS-hosted automation tool access into a company AWS account is to use cross-account IAM role assumption. Option A follows the standard AWS pattern: the company creates an IAM role in its own account that has only the permissions the vendor needs, and the role’s trust policy allows the vendor’s IAM role (in the vendor’s AWS account) to assume it. This approach avoids creating long-lived credentials in the company account and supports least privilege, auditing, and easy revocation.

With role assumption, the vendor continues to authenticate in its own AWS account and uses AWS STS to obtain temporary credentials when accessing the company account. Temporary credentials reduce exposure compared to access keys because they expire automatically and can be constrained with session duration, external IDs (where appropriate), and conditions. The company retains full control over permissions through the role policy, and CloudTrail can record AssumeRole events and subsequent API activity for auditing.

Option B is less secure because it creates an IAM user in the company account and would typically require managing long-lived credentials for the vendor tool, increasing the risk of leakage and ongoing operational overhead. Option C is not valid because IAM users are not shared across accounts; you cannot “add” a user from another account into an IAM group in your account. Option D is incorrect because “AWS account” is not a typical IAM identity provider type for this purpose; cross-account access is done through role trust policies, not by creating an IdP with an AWS account ID and username.

Therefore, A is the most secure solution because it uses short-lived credentials, enforces least privilege, centralizes control in the company account, and provides strong auditability without issuing permanent access keys.