Amazon Web Services Updated DVA-C02 Exam Questions and Answers by ryker

Why Option B is Correct:Amazon ECS does not natively process docker-compose.yml files. Instead, the configurations from docker-compose.yml must be converted into ECS-compatible configurations within a task definition. Task definitions are the primary way to specify container configurations in ECS, including service dependencies like databases, caches, and volumes.

Steps to Resolve the Error:

Extract the configurations from the docker-compose.yml file.

Map the dependencies and settings to the appropriate ECS task definition fields.

Deploy the task definition to the ECS cluster.

Why Other Options are Incorrect:

Option A: Docker labels do not directly impact ECS task execution or integrate with ECS service configurations.

Option C: ECS namespaces do not exist as a feature.

Option D: Changing the service type to REPLICA does not resolve the issue of missing service dependency configurations.

AWS Documentation References:

Amazon ECS Task Definitions

Migrating Docker Compose Workloads to ECS

This solution will meet the requirements by using IAM database authentication for Aurora, which enables using IAM roles or users to authenticate with Aurora databases instead of using passwords or other secrets. The developer can use IAM database authentication for Aurora to enable secure database connections for all the Lambda functions that access Aurora DB instance. The developer can create an IAM role with permission to connect to Aurora DB instance and attach it to each Lambda function. The developer can also configure Aurora DB instance to use IAM database authentication and enable encryption in transit using SSL certificates. This way, the Lambda functions can use a single securely encrypted database connection string to access Aurora without needing any secrets or passwords. Option B is not optimal because it will store the credentials and read them from an encrypted Amazon RDS DB instance, which may introduce additional costs and complexity for managing and accessing another RDS DB instance. Option C is not optimal because it will store the credentials in AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store as a secure string parameter, which may require additional steps or permissions to retrieve and decrypt the credentials from Parameter Store. Option D is not optimal because it will use Lambda environment variables with a shared AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key for encryption, which may not be secure or scalable as environment variables are stored as plain text unless encrypted with AWS KMS.

AWS Secrets Manager is purpose-built for securely storing and managing sensitive information such as API keys, tokens, and credentials. It provides automatic secret rotation , fine-grained IAM access control, encryption at rest using AWS KMS, and audit logging through AWS CloudTrail. This makes it the most secure and scalable option for managing short-lived authentication keys.

AWS Lambda extensions enable efficient secret retrieval by caching secrets locally within the execution environment. This reduces repeated calls to Secrets Manager on every invocation, improving performance and lowering costs while maintaining up-to-date credentials. AWS documentation explicitly recommends using Lambda extensions or caching logic for secrets that are frequently accessed.

Storing secrets in S3 (Option B) or environment variables (Option C) lacks built-in rotation and increases exposure risk. Parameter Store (Option D) supports encryption but does not provide native rotation for secrets without custom automation, making it less suitable for this use case.

Therefore, Secrets Manager with Lambda extensions provides the most secure, automated, and operationally efficient solution.

Sensitive environment variables in Lambda should be protected using encryption helpers integrated with AWS KMS. Lambda environment variables are encrypted at rest, and when using a customer managed KMS key, teams can control the key policy, access, and rotation for their own microservices—matching the policy requirement that each team has “full control” over key rotation. AWS managed keys do not provide the same level of customer control over lifecycle and rotation decisions.

Therefore, the correct approach is to create customer managed KMS keys (one per team/service boundary or per microservice, depending on governance) and configure each Lambda function to use the relevant CMK for encrypting its environment variables. The Lambda execution role must have permission to use the key for decryption at runtime, typically requiring kms:Decrypt (and sometimes kms:DescribeKey depending on tooling). This is captured by Option B.

Option A and D use AWS managed keys, which do not satisfy the requirement for each team to control rotation. Rotation control (and policy ownership) is a key differentiator of customer managed keys.

Option C is not correct because the Lambda execution role does not need kms:CreateGrant and kms:Encrypt for decrypting environment variables at runtime. Over-permissioning increases risk. The Lambda service handles encryption of environment variables; the function runtime principally needs the ability to decrypt.