Amazon Web Services Updated DVA-C02 Exam Questions and Answers by constance

The bottleneck in this architecture is typically the relational database (RDS MySQL), which has limited concurrent connections and write throughput compared with bursty API traffic. Because transaction volume spikes during the day and drops to near zero at night, the system needs a way to absorb bursts without over-provisioning the database (which would be costly and underutilized at night).

A cost-effective way to add elasticity is to introduce Amazon SQS as a buffer between API ingestion and database writes. With SQS, devices (or the API/Lambda) enqueue transactions quickly, and Lambda consumers process the queue at a controlled rate. The key is to prevent Lambda from overwhelming RDS with too many concurrent writes or connections. Setting reserved concurrency on the Lambda function limits the maximum number of concurrent executions, which effectively caps database connection pressure and smooths write load. This prevents overload events that cause errors/timeouts while still allowing the system to scale up to the reserved concurrency limit during peaks.

Option D captures this correct control mechanism: SQS for buffering + Lambda reserved concurrency matched to the DB’s connection capacity.

Option C is incorrect because “enhanced fanout” is a Kinesis Data Streams feature, not an SQS feature.

Options A and B focus on scaling Aurora read replicas, which helps read scaling, not write-heavy transaction ingestion. POS transaction processing is typically write-intensive; scaling read replicas does not solve the core elasticity problem. Also, migrating databases is higher effort and cost than adding a queue and tuning Lambda concurrency.

Therefore, adding SQS and setting Lambda reserved concurrency to protect RDS connections is the most cost-effective elasticity improvement.

This solution allows the developer to create and delete branches in AWS CodeCommit by granting the codecommit:CreateBranch and codecommit:DeleteBranch permissions. These are the minimum permissions required for this task, following the principle of least privilege. Option B grants too many permissions, such as codecommit:Put*, which allows the developer to create, update, or delete any resource in CodeCommit. Option C grants too few permissions, such as codecommit:Update*, which does not allow the developer to create or delete branches. Option D grants all permissions, such as codecommit:*, which is not secure or recommended.

“Encryption in transit” for S3 means requiring requests to use HTTPS (TLS) rather than HTTP. AWS provides a standard policy condition key, aws:SecureTransport, that evaluates to true when the request is made over SSL/TLS and false when it is not. To enforce TLS for all cross-account GetObject requests, the most reliable control point is the S3 bucket resource-based policy, because the bucket is the resource being accessed and the bucket owner can enforce conditions regardless of which external account is calling.

Option A is the established pattern: add an explicit Deny statement in the bucket policy that denies all S3 actions (or at least s3:GetObject) when aws:SecureTransport is false. An explicit deny overrides any allows, ensuring that even if another account’s IAM policy allows access, the request will still be blocked if it is not using HTTPS.

Option B is backwards because it would allow insecure transport rather than deny it.

Option C is weaker because you cannot reliably enforce policies in other accounts (and principals could change roles or permissions). The bucket owner should enforce transport security at the bucket level.

Option D is not the right layer: the KMS key policy controls key usage, but the S3 GetObject transport requirement is best enforced by the S3 bucket policy. Also, S3 access can be denied before KMS is even involved.

Therefore, enforce HTTPS by adding a bucket policy Deny when aws:SecureTransport is false.

Why Option B is Correct:The RetainExceptOnCreate deletion policy ensures that the IAM user is retained after successful stack creation but is deleted if the stack creation fails or rolls back. This meets both requirements.

Why Other Options are Incorrect:

Option A: The Retain policy retains the resource regardless of stack status and does not delete the IAM user upon rollback.

Option C: Updating the service role for termination protection does not address the specific deletion behavior for the IAM user.

Option D: Stack policy controls updates, not resource deletion behavior during rollbacks.

AWS Documentation References:

CloudFormation DeletionPolicy Attribute