ECCouncil Updated 312-50v13 Exam Questions and Answers by ivor

The hacker’s next step to confirm the XSS vulnerability would be to utilize a script hosted on the application’s domain to test the form. This is because the application’s CSP allows scripts from its own domain, but not from inline or external sources. Therefore, the hacker can try to inject a payload that references a script file on the same domain as the application, such as:

where script.js contains some benign code, such as alert('XSS') or print('XSS'). If the script executes in the browser, then the hacker has confirmed the XSS vulnerability. Otherwise, the CSP has blocked the script and prevented the XSS attack.

The other options are not feasible or effective for the following reasons:

A. Try to disable the CSP to bypass script restrictions: This option is not feasible because the hacker cannot disable the CSP on the server side, and the browser enforces the CSP on the client side. The hacker would need to modify the browser settings or use a browser extension to disable the CSP, but this would not affect the victim’s browser or the application’s security.

B. Inject a benign script inline to the form to see if it executes: This option is not effective because the application’s CSP disallows inline scripts, meaning scripts that are embedded in the HTML code. Therefore, the hacker would not be able to inject a script tag or an event handler attribute that contains some code, such as:

 or 

The CSP would block these scripts and prevent the XSS attack.

D. Load a script from an external domain to test the vulnerability: This option is not effective because the application’s CSP disallows scripts from external domains, meaning scripts that are loaded from a different domain than the application. Therefore, the hacker would not be able to inject a script tag that references a script file on another domain, such as:

The CSP would block these scripts and prevent the XSS attack.

Types of Password Attacks - Active Online Attacks: Internal Monologue Attack Attackers perform an internal monologue(獨自) attack using SSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) from a user-mode application, where a local procedure call to the NTLM authentication package is invoked to calculate the NetNTLM response in the context of the logged-on user.Attacker disables the security controls of NetNTLMv1, extracts all the non-network logon tokens from all the active processes to masquerade as legitimate users. (P.594/578)

The Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) Cloud Computing and Data Protection module emphasizes the importance of resilient backup strategies to protect against data tampering, ransomware, and unauthorized modification.

The 3-2-1 backup model is a widely recommended best practice referenced in CEH materials. It requires maintaining:

3 copies of data

Stored on 2 different media types

With 1 copy stored offsite

This approach ensures that even if cloud backups are compromised or altered, clean and uncompromised versions remain available. CEH documentation highlights this model as a core defense against data integrity attacks in cloud environments.

Option D directly mitigates the risk of backup tampering.

Options A, B, and C address unrelated security concerns and do not protect backup integrity.

https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an attack that forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they’re currently authenticated. With a little help of social engineering (such as sending a link via email or chat), an attacker may trick the users of a web application into executing actions of the attacker’s choosing. If the victim is a normal user, a successful CSRF attack can force the user to perform state changing requests like transferring funds, changing their email address, and so forth. If the victim is an administrative account, CSRF can compromise the entire web application.

CSRF is an attack that tricks the victim into submitting a malicious request. It inherits the identity and privileges of the victim to perform an undesired function on the victim’s behalf. For most sites, browser requests automatically include any credentials associated with the site, such as the user’s session cookie, IP address, Windows domain credentials, and so forth. Therefore, if the user is currently authenticated to the site, the site will have no way to distinguish between the forged request sent by the victim and a legitimate request sent by the victim.

CSRF attacks target functionality that causes a state change on the server, such as changing the victim’s email address or password, or purchasing something. Forcing the victim to retrieve data doesn’t benefit an attacker because the attacker doesn’t receive the response, the victim does. As such, CSRF attacks target state-changing requests.

It’s sometimes possible to store the CSRF attack on the vulnerable site itself. Such vulnerabilities are called “stored CSRF flaws”. This can be accomplished by simply storing an IMG or IFRAME tag in a field that accepts HTML, or by a more complex cross-site scripting attack. If the attack can store a CSRF attack in the site, the severity of the attack is amplified. In particular, the likelihood is increased because the victim is more likely to view the page containing the attack than some random page on the Internet. The likelihood is also increased because the victim is sure to be authenticated to the site already.