VMware Updated 3V0-24.25 Exam Questions and Answers by ema

Harbor reduces the risk of running vulnerable or tampered images primarily throughvulnerability scanningandimage signing.Vulnerability scanning (E)detects known CVEs in image layers (OS packages and application dependencies, depending on the scanner configuration). This allows teams to identify—and gate the use of—images that contain high/critical vulnerabilities before those images are deployed to Kubernetes clusters. Enforcing scanning as part of the image promotion process helps prevent outdated images with known CVEs from being pulled into production.Image signing (A)provides integrity and provenance controls by enabling consumers to verify that an image was produced and approved by a trusted publisher and has not been altered. When combined with admission controls/policies (for example, only allowing signed images from specific projects), signing helps block unauthorized or unapproved images from being deployed, which is critical when the incident involves exposed internal APIs and supply-chain risk.

The other choices do not directly prevent recurrence:automatic image update (B)is not a core Harbor registry control,deploy both container and VM images (C)is a content capability rather than a security control, andautomatic image validation (D)is not a standard Harbor registry capability distinct from signing/scanning.

VCF 9.0 describesCloud Native Storage (CNS) on vCenteras the component that implements “provisioning and lifecycle operations for persistent volumes.” When provisioning persistent volumes, CNS “interacts with the vSphere First Class Disk functionality to create virtual disks that back the volumes,” and it “communicates with Storage Policy Based Management to guarantee a required level of service to the disks.” This is exactly the storage-policy-to-backed-virtual-disk relationship the question is testing: storage policies (via policy-based management) define requirements, and CNS is the vCenter-side service that applies those requirements while creating and managing the backing storage objects.

In contrast,CSI(including Supervisor CNS-CSI and VKS pvCSI) is the Kubernetes-facing interface/driver used to request and consume storage, but it does not “provide” the vSphere storage policy system; rather, it relies on CNS/CNS-CSI and vCenter services to fulfill provisioning requests. Therefore,vSphere Cloud Native Storage (CNS)is the correct choice.

Configuration Order (in order):

Verify the name of the original VolumeSnapshot object in the Supervisor.

Create a VolumeSnapshotContent object.

Create a VolumeSnapshot object.

Verify that the VolumeSnapshot is marked with ReadyToUse as true.

Apre-provisioned snapshotworkflow means the snapshot already exists at the Supervisor/storage layer, and you are “importing” it into Kubernetes by creating the Kubernetes objects that reference it. That’s why the first step is toidentify/verify the exact snapshot nameas it exists in the Supervisor context—this is the authoritative identifier you must point to when you create Kubernetes snapshot metadata. Next, you create theVolumeSnapshotContentobject, which represents theactual snapshot on the storage backendand includes the handle/reference to that pre-existing snapshot. With the content object in place, you then create theVolumeSnapshotobject, which is theuser-facing Kubernetes object(namespaced) that binds to the pre-provisioned VolumeSnapshotContent (either explicitly or via binding rules). Finally, you validate the outcome by checking that theVolumeSnapshot shows ReadyToUse: true, confirming the binding succeeded and Kubernetes can use the snapshot for restore/clone workflows.

In Kubernetes RBAC, cluster-wide permissions are defined withClusterRoleand granted to a user, group, or service account by creating aClusterRoleBinding. The VCF 9.0 documentation for VKS cluster access describes the RBAC workflow used to grant access: first you “define a Role or ClusterRolefor the user or group,” and then you “create a RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBindingfor the user or group and apply it to the cluster.” This wording reflects the RBAC distinction:RoleBindingis scoped to a namespace, whereasClusterRoleBindingis used when the permissions must apply at thecluster scope(cluster-wide resources and/or across namespaces).

VCF 9.0 further illustrates the purpose of ClusterRoleBinding in a token-auth example: it lists the required objects, including “ClusterRole: This defines the access to the Kubernetes cluster” and “ClusterRoleBinding: This binds the created Service Account with the defined ClusterRole.” That binding step is what grants the subject the cluster-level privileges defined in the ClusterRole, makingClusterRoleBindingthe correct object for permissions to cluster-wide resources.