Juniper Updated JN0-336 Exam Questions and Answers by georgina

The correct answers are A and D. Juniper documentation describes domain PC probing as a supplement to event-log reading. When a user logs in to the domain, the domain controller event log normally provides the user-to-IP mapping. If that IP address-to-username mapping is not available from the event log, JIMS initiates a domain PC probe to the endpoint to obtain the active username and domain. JIMS can also use probes to determine a device’s status after the logged-in state expires, so the operational idea is not blind periodic probing; it is used to resolve or validate identity state when normal event-log information is missing or stale.

Option D is correct because the result of identity collection is reported back to SRX Series devices. JIMS generates reports containing IP address, username, and group relationship information, keeps a list of reports communicated to SRX devices, and sends those reports so SRX devices can create authentication-table entries for identity-aware policy enforcement. Options B and C are wrong because the tested PC-probe behavior is not “every 30 seconds” or “every 60 seconds.” Those values confuse PC probing with other timers or query intervals. Reference topics: JIMS, domain PC probing, event-log identity mapping, SRX authentication table, identity-aware security policies.

The correct answers are A and D. A mobile command center using a 5G ISP behind CGNAT is operating behind dynamic address translation. For IPsec to work reliably through NAT, the SRX must support NAT Traversal, which encapsulates IKE and ESP traffic in UDP/4500 after NAT is detected. Juniper states that NAT-T is used when NAT devices exist in the datapath and that NAT keepalives are required because NAT devices age out UDP translations. Juniper’s Security Director VPN workflow also specifically says to enable NAT-T when the dynamic endpoint is behind a NAT device.

DPD is also required because mobile and carrier-grade NAT connections can disappear, roam, or become stale without a clean tunnel teardown. Juniper defines Dead Peer Detection as the method used by IPsec peers to verify whether the remote peer is still present and responsive by sending encrypted IKE notification payloads and waiting for acknowledgements. Option B is not the best answer because IKEv1 aggressive mode is weaker and does not provide identity protection; Juniper also notes that aggressive mode applies only to IKEv1. Option C is invalid because IKEv2 aggressive mode does not exist. Reference topics: IPsec VPN, NAT-T, CGNAT, dynamic endpoints, DPD, IKE peer availability.

The correct answer is B. Add custom-attack Custom-FTP-Attack to the attacks section and change the action to drop-packet. In the exhibit, the IDP rule is built under rulebase-ips with a match block and a then block. Attack objects belong inside the match attacks hierarchy because they define what malicious pattern the IDP rule is trying to detect. Juniper’s IDP documentation states that attack objects are specified in rules to identify malicious activity and that the rule’s attack objects/groups are the attacks the device matches in monitored traffic.

The enforcement behavior belongs in the then action hierarchy. The current rule uses close-client; to meet the requirement, it must be changed to drop-packet. Juniper defines Drop Packet as an IDP action that drops a matching packet before it reaches its destination without closing the connection. Option A keeps the wrong action. Option C is structurally wrong because a custom attack object is not configured under the action section. Option D is also wrong because the notification section controls logging/alert behavior, not attack matching. Reference topics: IDP rulebase, custom attack objects, match attacks hierarchy, IDP actions, drop-packet behavior.

The correct answers are B and D. In Junos SSL proxy terminology, client protection maps to SSL forward proxy. In a forward-proxy deployment, the SRX sits between internal clients and external SSL/TLS servers. The firewall intercepts the server certificate, generates a substitute certificate, signs it with the configured root CA, decrypts the SSL session for inspection, and then re-encrypts traffic toward the destination server. Juniper’s SSL proxy configuration table shows that a forward-proxy profile uses root-ca configured = Yes and server-certificate configured = No. It also states that configuring neither certificate type fails commit validation, while configuring both root-ca and server-certificate in the same profile is unsupported.

Option A is wrong because a server certificate is required for reverse proxy/server protection, not for client-protection forward proxy. Option C is wrong because without a trusted root CA, client browsers would not trust the certificates generated by the SRX during interception. Juniper separately notes that the root CA certificate is required for client browsers to trust certificates signed by the firewall. Reference topics: SSL Proxy, client protection, SSL forward proxy, root CA, server protection, SSL reverse proxy.